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Abstract 
 
Purpose — We assess the risk-related disclosure practices in annual reports for 2005 of 
Portuguese companies in the non-finance sector.  
Design/methodology/approach — We conduct a content analysis of a sample of 81 
companies (42 listed and 39 unlisted). In considering corporate governance effects, the 
sample is reduced to the 42 listed companies that are required to disclose a corporate 
governance report.  
Findings —Implementation of IAS/IFRS and the European Union’s Modernisation 
Directive in 2005 did not affect the quantity and quality of risk-related disclosures 
positively.  Disclosures are generic, qualitative, and backward-looking. Public visibility 
(as assessed by size and environmental sensitivity) is a crucial influence in explaining 
risk-related disclosures: companies appear to manage their reputation through disclosure 
of risk-related information. Agency costs associated with leverage are important 
influences also. In listed companies, the presence of independent directors improves the 
level of risk-related disclosures.  
Research limitations —Content analysis does not allow readily for in-depth qualitative 
inquiry. The coding instrument is subject to coder bias. Information about risk can be 
provided in sources other than annual reports. The study is confined to one year/one 
country and pre-dates the global financial crisis (2008) and the implementation of IFRS 
7 (2007).  
Originality/value — The results point to the desirability of enhancing accountability by 
mandating further disclosure of substantive and relevant risk-related information in 
company annual reports. The risk-related disclosures observed are shown to be 
explained by a confluence of agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based 
perspectives. 
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Risk-related Disclosures by Non-finance Companies: Portuguese 
Practices and Discloser Characteristics 
 
Introduction 
There have been many calls to reduce asymmetries of access to corporate information 
and to improve the measurement and disclosure of risk-related matters (Szegö, 2002; 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Mohobbot, 2005). Such calls have been prompted by the 
inadequacy of risk reporting practices (Solomon et al., 2000).  
Most existing studies of risk-related disclosures [RRD] are based on empirical 
evidence from Anglo-Saxon, Dutch and Germanic countries (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Carlon et al., 2003; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; 
Lajili, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006); French and Latin countries (Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004; Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006); Asia-Pacific countries (Amran et al., 2009; 
Mohobbot, 2005); and Arab countries (Hassan, 2009). Generally, these prior studies 
have found that RRD are vague, generic, qualitative, backward looking, and inadequate 
for the information needs of stakeholders.  
Previous literature has focused mainly on explaining RRD in terms of stakeholder 
theory (Anram et al., 2009), institutional theory (Hassan, 2009) or agency theory 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Lajili, 2007). The present study is a 
response to the call by Roberts et al., (2005, p. 6) “for greater theoretical pluralism and 
more detailed attention to board processes and dynamics.” We proceed by proposing a 
theoretical framework based on a confluence of agency theory, legitimacy theory and 
resources-based perspectives. Such a framework was suggested by Roberts et al. (2005) 
and Aguilera (2005) but has not been used hitherto. We use this framework to address 
the thinness of empirical evidence by analysing disclosures of risk exposures and risk 
management practices in the annual reports for 2005 of non-finance companies 
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registered by the Portuguese Stock Exchange regulator, Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliários [CMVM]. Thus, we aim to ameliorate the incompleteness of prior 
research studies, and do so in the context of a different (and under-researched) European 
Latin country, Portugal. 
In the accounting regulatory setting in Portugal in 2005, Portuguese listed 
companies became obliged to comply with International Accounting Standards 
[IAS/IFRS] and the Modernisation Directive (Directive 2003/51/EC) of the European 
Parliament and Council (enacted into Portuguese law by Decree-law 35/2005). These 
two regulatory initiatives demanded extra RRD. A setting of regulatory change such as 
this has not featured previously in descriptive risk-related disclosure studies of non-
finance companies. Findings reported in previous literature relate to periods prior the 
implementation of IAS/IFRS or the Modernisation Directive in 2005. The timing of the 
present study will help to determine whether the adoption of these two regulatory 
initiatives affected the quantity and quality of RRD positively. 
Our results reveal that the adoption of IAS/IFRS and the Modernisation Directive 
did not affect the quantity and quality of RRD positively. Risk information disclosures 
were mainly vague, generic, qualitative, backward-looking, dispersed throughout the 
annual report, and inadequate for the information needs of stakeholders. They confirm 
the results of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Carlon et al. (2003), Combes-Thuélin et al. 
(2006), Kajuter (2006), Lajili and Zéghal (2005), and Linsley and Shrives (2006). 
Important influences on RRD are found to be reputation and litigation costs in 
companies with high public visibility (typically large companies in environmentally 
sensitive industries) and often with high levels of leverage. Agency costs were found 
likely to be reduced by the engagement of a Big4 auditing firm. When considering the 
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sub-sample composed only of the 42 listed companies, the monitoring provided by 
independent directors also appeared to reduce agency costs.  
In the following section we develop an analytical framework to contextualise the 
regulatory setting in Portugal, review previous literature, and develop hypotheses for 
testing. Thereafter, we explain our research method, report results, and present 
conclusions.  
 
Analytical Framework 
Regulatory Background 
For financial years starting on January 1, 2005, Regulation 1606/2002 of the European 
Commission required companies with securities traded on a regulated market to prepare 
consolidated accounts in accord with IAS. Accounting treatments for financial risks 
were established by such standards as IAS 1 (Presentation of Financial Statements), 
IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation) and IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement). These standards focused mainly on financial risk 
exposures and financial risk management policies. Other risk factors which could arise 
from contingent liabilities or contingent assets were dealt with by IAS 37 (Provisions, 
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets). IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures) became obligatory after January, 2007, although its adoption before 2007 
was recommended. 
 In 2005, companies not having securities traded on the Portuguese capital 
market were required to prepare their annual accounts in accord with the Portuguese 
Accounting Plan [PAP]. Additional mandatory risk-related disclosures were required by 
Accounting Directives [AD] such as AD 17 (Future Contracts), AD 27 (Segmental 
Reporting), and AD 29 (Environmental Issues). Non-finance companies were also 
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required to comply with some RRD demanded by corporate governance practice 
recommendations issued by the CMVM[1]. Further, in 2005 the enactment into 
Portuguese law of the Modernisation Directive of the European Parliament and Council 
required companies to describe their main risks and uncertainties in the management 
report. In respect of financial instruments companies were required also to describe their 
financial risk exposures and risk management activities related to financial risks.  
In this study, risk information disclosures are classified as mandatory if they are 
provided as a consequence of an explicit accounting rule or security exchange 
requirement. If the disclosed item involves management’s judgment or discretion in 
terms of materiality and significance, it is classified as voluntary[2].  
 
Prior Literature on Risk-Related Disclosures 
Several studies have noted the inadequacy and vagueness of RRD.  Carlon et al. (2003) 
found that the application of risk reporting requirements related to financial instruments 
was diverse, and that there was a large variation in the content and detail of voluntary 
risk reporting by Australian mining companies. In Italian and Canadian listed 
companies, voluntary RRD were mainly qualitative and focused on past and present 
risks rather than future risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). Linsley 
and Shrives (2006) found that RRD by UK listed companies were mainly qualitative, 
but that they were prone to report forward-looking risk information. Kajüter (2006) 
found that mandatory RRD of German companies in management reports was vague; 
that few RRD were precise and detailed; that most risks were described insufficiently; 
and that it was difficult to distinguish risks in terms of criticality. Some other studies 
have commented on the difficulty of assessing company risk profiles because of 
unstandardized presentation of risk in annual reports and because of the dispersal of 
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RRD throughout the annual report (Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 
2006). 
Studies of motivations for RRD have focused mainly on exploring voluntary 
disclosures of internal controls (Deumes & Knechel, 2008); voluntary RRD in annual 
reports and MD&A sections (Mohobbot, 2005; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004); mandatory 
RRD in the management report (Kajuter, 2006); and voluntary and mandatory RRD in 
annual reports (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Amram et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009; Lajili, 2007; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006).  
We adopt a broad concept of risk (including downside risk and upside risk) by 
considering whether risk is perceived as a threat (bad news) or as an opportunity to 
mitigate risk (good news). We regard risk to be any opportunity or prospect (or any 
hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure) that has affected the economic and financial 
situation of a company or may affect it in the future. Risk is regarded to include actions 
taken to manage, mitigate or deal with any opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat, 
or exposure; and the description and evaluation of internal control system effectiveness. 
We draw on findings of that companies make more risk management disclosures than 
risk disclosures in an attempt to promote an image of pro-active management (Combes-
Thuélin et al., 2006), 
Literature on RRD can be divided into three major groups, according to how the 
dependent variable is measured. As shown in Table 1, prior studies have used content 
analysis to build the dependent variable using sentences as the recording unit (Amran et 
al., 2009; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 
2006; Mohobbot, 2005), or words (Abraham & Cox, 2007), or disclosure indexes 
(Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 2009). The present study uses sentence counts. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
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 Motives for RRD have been explained by agency theory, political costs theory, 
stakeholder theory, signalling theory, institutional theory, and a proprietary costs 
perspective (Kajuter, 2006; Mohobbot, 2005). Hassan (2009) used the institutional 
theory notion of social legitimacy; Amran et al., (2009) drew upon stakeholder theory; 
and Abraham and Cox (2007), Deumes and Knechel (2008), and Lajili (2007) used 
agency assumptions to explain motivations for RRD. Table 1 presents the explanatory 
variables and empirical findings of each of the major studies. Some conflicting results 
are revealed. The studies explain several identical relationships between explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable, but by recourse to different theories. The present 
study conciliates this theoretical conflict by proposing a theoretical framework that has 
been suggested in prior literature, but not tested: that is, by explaining RRD as being 
grounded in agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective (Roberts 
et al., 2005; Aguilera, 2005). 
 
Development of Hypotheses 
Agency theory 
Agency theory explains how information asymmetry between shareholders, managers 
and creditors can be reduced by monitoring the opportunistic attitudes of managers. 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If shareholders and creditors do not observe companies’ 
risk management activities directly, they will tend to institute monitoring systems to 
increase the flow of information about those activities, and to reduce uncertainty 
(Linsmeier et al., 2002). In the absence of such monitoring mechanisms, managers seem 
more likely to perform opportunistically by withholding relevant information or by 
manipulating reporting to their advantage by making misleading disclosures (Latham & 
Jacobs, 2000). Four monitoring mechanisms (discussed below) are: the nature of the 
8 
 
specific ownership structures (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2009; 
Kajüter, 2006; Lajili, 2007); the way the board of directors is composed (especially in 
terms of the number of independent non-executive directors) (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Lajili, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008); the independence  of audit committees (Fraser 
& Henry, 2007), and the type of external auditor appointed (Oliveira et al., 2004).  
 
Ownership Structure 
In more concentrated ownership structures, agency costs are usually lower than in more 
diffuse structures involving outside ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ball et al., 
2000; Deumes & Knechel, 2008). Because larger shareholders play an active role in 
monitoring and controlling a firm, and are more willing to discipline poorly performing 
management, they can mitigate agency costs by intervening actively (Birt et al., 2006). 
Thus, there is less need for RRD. In more diffuse structures, agency problems increase 
because small shareholders find it more difficult to monitor the activities of 
management (Barako et al., 2006), and so greater levels of disclosure are expected. 
However, the literature offers two opposing views of the relationship between 
ownership structure and voluntary disclosure: convergence of interests and management 
entrenchment.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when the shareholding of the 
largest shareholder is high, and outside investors perceive that he/she behaves to 
maximize firm value, convergence of interests between them can occur. Outside 
investors will impose fewer contractual constraints on the firm, reducing agency costs. 
Since agency costs are lower there will be weaker incentives for the largest shareholder 
to manipulate or withhold information. There will be incentives to maintain levels of 
disclosure consistent with the maximization of firm value. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is expected between owners’ holdings and disclosure.  
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In the case of management entrenchment, Morck et al. (1988) argue that moral 
hazard problems will occur and information asymmetries increase, so that consequently, 
a negative relation between insider holdings and disclosure should be expected.  
Furthermore, Jung and Kwon (2002) present opposing views of the role of 
institutional holders/blockholders: active monitoring and strategic alignment.  If 
institutional holders/blockholders are seen as long-term investors they can work as 
effective devices of monitoring management. Thus, a positive relation between their 
shareholdings and disclosure is expected. But under the strategic alignment hypothesis, 
institutional holders/blockholders and owners cooperate, thereby reducing monitoring, 
such that a negative relationship is expected between their holdings and disclosure. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) contend that the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
ownership structure depends on the investment planning strategies of institutional 
investors. 
 Previous RRD literature has found divergent results. Lajili (2007) and Kajuter 
(2006) found negative relations. Abraham and Cox (2007) found negative and positive 
relations, and Mohobbot (2005) did not find any relation at all.  
Hypothesis 1: There is an association between concentrated ownership structures 
and the volume of RRD in an annual report. 
 
Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Theoretically, independent non-executive directors monitor the activities of executive 
directors indirectly (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). But non-executive directors are 
exposed to higher levels of risk, personally. This is because, by acting as corporate 
outsiders, they usually have little involvement in a company’s daily management (Lim 
et al., 2007). They have incentives to demand the disclosure of more information to 
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balance the levels of risk to their personal reputation. In theory, independent non-
executive directors are not influenced by corporate insiders. Thus, a higher level of 
disclosure can be expected from companies with a higher proportion of independent 
directors (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Consequently, to reduce agency costs, companies 
with a higher percentage of independent directors will be prone to disclose more 
information.  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the proportion of 
independent (non-executive directors) on the board and the volume 
of RRD in an annual report. 
 
Audit Committee Independence 
As companies become larger, complex and diversified, it becomes more difficult for 
boards to retain effective control and to manage risks. As a consequence, responsibility 
for control is often delegated to employees. Where such delegation occurs, it is 
understandable that boards would require support from organization-wide monitoring 
mechanisms, such as audit committees (Fraser & Henry, 2007). However, for an audit 
committee to be effective it should be independent and include non-executive directors 
(Turley & Zaman, 2004). Therefore, companies with a higher proportion of non-
executive directors serving on their audit committee are likely to attach greater 
importance to RRD and to the reduction of agency costs.  
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between audit committee 
independence and the volume of RRD in an annual report. 
 
Auditor Type 
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Companies with high agency costs tend to contract higher quality auditing firms — the 
Big4 international auditing firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These larger and well-
known auditing firms tend to encourage companies to disclose more information to 
maintain the audit firms’ reputation and avoid reputational costs to them (Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2004). 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between the engagement of a Big4 
international auditing firm and the volume of RRD in an annual 
report. 
 
Leverage 
Companies with high levels of debt tend to be highly leveraged, more speculative and 
riskier. Debt-holders have greater power over the financial structure of such companies. 
From an agency theory perspective, creditors of highly leveraged companies have 
strong incentives to encourage management to disclose more information (Amran et al., 
2009). Most prior literature has not found any significant relationship between RRD and 
leverage (Abraham & Cox, 2005; Amran et al., 2009; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Mohoboot, 2005). A possible explanation seems likely to be that monitoring 
information can be furnished by means other than in the annual report (Leuz et al., 
2004). 
Hypothesis 5: There is an association between leverage and the volume of RRD in 
an annual report. 
 
Legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective 
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 Managers have incentives to increase the transparency of RRD by conforming to rules 
and stakeholder expectations. Stakeholders are interested in RRD because they “supply 
critical resources, place something of value ‘at risk’, and have sufficient power to affect 
the performance of the enterprise” (Post et al., 2002, p. 8, italics applied).  
Resources-based perspectives address the link between a firm’s valuable resources 
and its performance (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006a). To be valuable, resources should be 
difficult to imitate and, therefore, help in developing competitive advantages. One such 
valuable resource is corporate reputation— an intangible asset that is nurtured to fulfil 
stakeholders’ expectations and attract investors and resources (Galbreath, 2005). 
Stakeholders “will come to the firm attracted by the information content of its 
reputation” (Sabaté & Puente, 2003, p. 281). Therefore, the economic rationale for 
building corporate reputation is to “reflect the extent to which external stakeholders see 
a firm as ‘good’ and not ‘bad’” (Roberts & Dowling, 2002, p. 1078). 
Like legitimacy, reputation must be gained, maintained or restored (Suchman, 
1995). Greater levels of public visibility imply a greater level of stakeholders’ interest. 
Consequently, greater levels of legitimacy and corporate reputation will be required to 
manage the crucial stakeholders who provide resources to organizations and affect their 
ability to operate (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009). This legitimation process rests 
strongly on the influential perceptions of crucial stakeholders of the firm’s actions and 
activities, based on a specified level of public disclosure (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 
2009). Disclosure of risk information will help to ameliorate litigation risks and 
potential reputational damages. Thus, legitimacy is maintained through a legitimation 
process to manage corporate reputation and achieve the best interests of stakeholders by 
disclosure (Bebbington et al., 2008). Commonly, proxies for public visibility have 
included size, and industry variables (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a, 2008b).  
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Size 
Brammer and Pavlin (2008, p. 124) argue that “larger firms (...) tend to be more visible 
to relevant publics [crucial stakeholders].” It is likely that larger companies will 
consider RRD as a way to enhance corporate reputation through disclosure. This is 
because greater levels of public visibility imply a closer scrutiny from stakeholders 
(Amram et al., 2009; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a).  
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive association between company size and the volume 
of RRD in a company annual report. 
 
Environmental Sensitivity 
Risks are firm-specific (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Manufacturing industries and 
politically and environmentally sensitive industries (such as oil, gas, or high 
technology) are prone to disclose more information (Brammer & Pavlin, 2008; Cooke, 
1992; Hannifa & Cooke, 2002). Environmentally sensitive companies have greater 
social pressures in terms of stakeholder scrutiny. Managers of such companies have 
incentives to make more RRD to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate 
reputation and management skills. 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive association between the level of environmental 
sensitivity in an industry and the volume of RRD in the annual 
reports of companies in that industry. 
 
Control variables 
Company Listing Status 
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Company listing status has been used as a proxy for public visibility (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006b; Leventis & Weetman, 2004). Listed companies are considered to be 
more visible than other companies, they tend to receive more attention from the general 
public and are subject to more extensive media coverage (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006b). 
But, listed companies usually have greater agency costs (Oliveira et al., 2006; Lopes & 
Rodrigues, 2007). Thus, greater levels of RRD are expected.  
 
Accounting Standards 
The accounting standards adopted can generate different levels of disclosure. In our 
sample some companies adopted the PAP, and others adopted IAS/IFRS for the first 
time.  
 
Research Method 
Sample 
We analysed RRD in the consolidated annual reports for 2005 of a sample of 81 
Portuguese companies registered by the CMVM[3]. Our sample comprised all 42 non-
finance companies listed on the regulated Euronext Lisbon market as at December 31, 
2005, together with 39 non-finance companies not listed on any regulated market. When 
considering corporate governance effects, our sample was reduced to the 42 listed 
companies, since only listed companies are required to disclose a corporate governance 
report.  
 
Dependent Variables  
We used content analysis to quantify RRD. Our specific measure was formulated from 
categories used by Abraham and Cox (2007). We developed three risk exposure 
15 
 
categories: financial risk [FR], non-financial [NFR], and risk management framework 
[RMFW]. These categories were used to calculate the dependent variable: risk-related 
disclosure level.  
Four semantic properties of the information disclosed were used in the content 
analysis:  
• economic sign (monetary/non-monetary);  
• type of measure (past/future);  
• outlook (good/bad/neutral); and  
• type of disclosure (voluntary/mandatory) (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006).  
Abraham and Cox (2007) used words as the recording unit and only analysed the 
narrative content. We assess the narrative content of the annual reports using sentences 
as the recording unit, in view of the findings of Milne and Adler (1999) that sentences 
are more reliable than words and pages in capturing thematic approaches. Information 
in graphs and tables was coded after establishing specific decision rules based on 
methods used by Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Beattie and Thomson (2007). The risk-
related disclosure level for the jth company was calculated as: 
RRDj = ∑
=
sa
i
ijfr
0
 + ∑
=
sa
i
ijnfr
0
 + ∑
=
sa
i
ijrmfw
0
 
where  
frij = number of financial risk sentences for the sentence attribute i in the jth company;  
nfrij = number of non-financial risk sentences for the sentence attribute i in the jth 
company;  
rmfwij = number of risk management framework sentences for the sentence attribute i in 
the jth company; and 
sa = number of sentence attributes (sa = 24). 
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To assure the reliability of the content analysis, we followed the methods outlined 
by Krippendorf (2004). Our coding drew upon procedures used by Lajili and Zéghal 
(2005), and Linsley and Shrives (2006). Content analysis of the entire sample was 
performed by the first author, informed by his prior coding of an initial sample of five 
annual reports with another (independently operating) coder. The prior coding helped 
refine a set of pre-established decision rules which were then applied to another sample 
of five annual reports that were coded independently by the two coders. Scott’s pi 
measure of inter-rater reliability was 0.81 — a level considered acceptable in analysis of 
corporate report disclosures (Hackston & Milne, 1996).  
  
Independent and Control Variables  
Table 2 presents definitions of independent variables and control variables, together 
with the signs of these variables as they are likely to be predicted by agency theory, 
legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Consistent with Deumes and Knechel (2008), and Lajili (2007) we used 
shareholdings greater than 10 per cent [TOP10], and minority controlling votes [MCV] 
(assessed by the highest proportion of voting rights that belong to a single shareholder), 
as proxies for ownership structures. These two proxies were highly correlated. A 
principal component analysis was also applied and an ownership structure index was 
computed to overcome potential collinearity. Only one component, explaining 87 per 
cent of the total variance, was extracted (Eigenvalue>1). The principal components 
analysis was validated by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
(KMO = 0.50) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 = 58.67; p ≤ 0.01). Internal 
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consistency was corroborated by the high level of Cronbach’s Alpha (0.85). The 
component extracted represents a unique composite ownership structure index for the jth 
company:  
OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREj = 0.931*TOP10j + 0.931*MCVj  
The variable “independent non-executive directors” was proxied by the proportion 
of independent non-executive directors on the board (Deumes & Knechel, 2008).  
The variable “audit committee independence” was proxied by the proportion of 
non-executive directors to total board members. 
The variable “auditor type” was measured by a dummy variable that was assigned 
1 if the auditing firm was a Big 4 firm, and 0 otherwise (Deumes & Knechel, 2008; 
Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006).  
“Leverage” was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets (Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 2009).  
“Size” was assessed using the variables total assets [TA], total sales [TS] and 
number of employees [NE] (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a, 2008b). These size variables 
were highly correlated. Principal component analysis was applied to generate an index 
for size. Only one component, explaining 88 per cent of the total variance, was 
extracted (Eigenvalue > 1). The principal components analysis was validated by the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.73) and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (χ2 = 208.03; p ≤ 0.01). Internal consistency was corroborated by the high 
level of Cronbach’s Alpha (0.93). The component extracted represented a unique 
composite size index for the jth company: 
SIZEj = 0.928*TAj + 0.963*TSj + 0.929*NEj 
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“Environmental sensitivity” was measured by assigning 1 if the company 
belonged to an environmentally sensitive industry (such mining, oil and gas, chemicals, 
construction and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other metals 
electricity, gas distribution and water), and 0 otherwise (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008b). 
 
Control Variables  
A “company’s listing status” was assigned 1 if the company was listed on one or more 
regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise. 
The variable “Accounting Standards” was measured by considering the 
accounting frame of reference adopted by each company in 2005. Companies which 
adopted IAS/IFRS were assigned 1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Empirical models 
The estimation models test whether factors associated with agency theory [A] and 
legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective [LRb] affect the volume of RRD in 
company j when we control for other company-level drivers of disclosure [C]. 
RRDj = f (Aj, LRbj, Cj) + j 
 
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3 (Panel A) identified 3,582 sentences containing RRD: 1,323 were of FR factors, 
1,860 were of NFR factors, and 399 were of RMFW factors.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
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RMFW disclosures included descriptions of risk management systems (usually 
provided in corporate governance reports). Although this type of information is 
important from a legitimacy perspective (Bhimani, 2009) it is unlikely to help readers 
understand whether the internal control system is effective, since it was descriptive, 
generic and often vague. 
The top band of Table 3 (Panel A) shows that the total number of sentences of bad 
news disclosure (n=1,548) and good news disclosure (n=1,611) are almost equal. These 
results are at odds with prior findings of higher levels of good news disclosures (Linsley 
& Shrives, 2006). However, they are consistent with agency theory, legitimacy theory 
and resources-based perspectives: that is, managers promote an image of pro-activity by 
disclosing almost the same levels of risk and risk management information in order to 
reduce asymmetries (Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006). 
About one third of risk disclosures were followed by discussion of how those risks 
are managed. If markets believe implicitly that “no news is bad news”, and if companies 
did not disclose bad news, this would be interpreted as hiding some problems 
(Lundholm & Winkle, 2006). Therefore, in accord with legitimacy theory and resource-
based perspectives, managers decrease reputation costs by disclosing bad news to 
increase the credibility of their reporting (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Skinner, 1994).  
The second band of Table 3 (Panel A) shows that backward-looking RRD are 
much more frequent than forward-looking disclosures. These results are consistent with 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) and Lajili and Zéghal (2005), but are inconsistent with 
Linsley and Shrives (2006). These findings are also consistent with legitimacy theory 
and resources-based perspectives incentives: backward-looking information usually is 
more reliable and has less potential to harm reputation.  
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The third band of Table 3 (Panel A) shows a much greater frequency of non-
monetary RRD than monetary disclosures, consistent with Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), 
Lajili and Zéghal (2005), and Linsley and Shrives (2006). About a quarter of all RRD 
are quantitative, divided equally between tabular and narrative disclosures. About three 
quarters of the tabular information disclosed liquidity difficulties and provided details of 
counterparty default. The desire of managers to engage in non-monetary disclosures 
helps convey understanding of their performance, aids legitimation, and promotes a 
good reputation and image − all in accord with legitimacy theory and resources-based 
perspectives. 
 The fourth and bottom band of Table 3 (Panel A) shows that voluntary NFR 
disclosures are much greater than mandatory disclosures. From a legitimacy and 
resources-based perspective, NFR disclosures are important: they provide information 
about business risks such as strategic, operational, and environmental risk. This is 
helpful to stakeholders in assessing whether a business is performing according to their 
expectations. Mandatory FR disclosures are significantly greater than voluntary 
disclosures.   
Table 3 (Panel B) presents the tests of the differences in the means (medians) of 
risk-related sentence attributes for each risk-related category, and confirms previous 
discussion. 
Table 4 shows the mean number of RRD sentences was 44.22 (range 4 to 143, s.d. 
30.79). Some companies made very few disclosures. Of the 81 company annual reports 
analysed, only two disclosed principal risks and uncertainties clearly. Only 15 aligned 
strategy with risk disclosure.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
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Generally, most companies did not distinguish between company-specific risks, 
industry-specific risks, and general risks. Only one third of companies discussed risk 
matters in a special section of the management report or in the notes. Only two 
companies included information about negative changes on external ratings; and only 
four entered clear conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal control systems. 
Two companies identified the models used to measure risk (internal scorings, stress 
scenarios, repricing gap and liquidity gap). Three companies disclosed the use of VaR 
(or similar) statistics (Earnings-at-Risk, Cash flow-at-Risk) to measure risk and 
discussed the statistical method used (Monte Carlo simulation or Risk Metrics), the 
range of confidence (95 or 99 per cent), and the holding period (5 days, 10 days or 3 
months). One company disclosed a quantitative VaR threshold. Two companies 
disclosed the results of sensitivity analysis related to foreign currency and interest rate 
risks, but did not explain the methods and assumptions used. In general, the RRD 
seemed perfunctory. They were probably unhelpful in informing investors about the 
impact of each risk factor on company performance. 
Table 4 shows that the proportion of independent directors (mean = 0.14) on the 
board is very low compared to the proportion recommended by the CMVM of 0.25. The 
independence of the audit committee (mean = 0.36) is also low, possibly impairing 
RRD. The mean values for ownership structure confirm that Portugal has many family-
dominated companies with a complex network of ownership, and a substantial number 
of shares owned by other companies or one single shareholder (mean = 0.57) (Mota, 
2003). The variables for proportion of independent directors and for audit committee 
independence were only computed for listed companies (N = 42) because only listed 
companies disclose this information in their corporate governance reports.  
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Bivariate Analysis 
Pearson correlation coefficients were determined among continuous variables and 
Spearman correlation coefficients were determined between categorical and continuous 
variables, as presented in Table 5. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients and 
value inflated factors suggests that multicollinearity is minimal (Table 5).  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
 Correlations between independent variables and RRD are significant (p-value < 
0.01) for independent non-executive directors, audit committee independence, size, 
auditor type (p-value < 0.05) environmental sensitivity, (p-value < 0.1) ownership 
structure, and leverage, all with signs as predicted. Positive and significant (correlations 
p-value < 0.01) were found between the control variables and RRD.  
 
Multiple Regressions 
OLS multiple regressions were used to test the interrelationship between the various 
independent and control variables and RRD. The assumptions underlying the regression 
models were tested for autocorrelation, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, outliers and 
influential observations, and the normality of residuals. Four influential observations 
were removed from the analysis. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors test suggested 
that the raw dependent variables and the continuous independent variables were not 
distributed normally. Therefore, before running the regression models, dependent 
variables and continuous independent variables were transformed to normal scores 
using Blom’s transformation (Cooke, 1998).  
Table 6 shows that the regression model for listed and unlisted companies is 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) for RRD (adj. R2 = 0.26)[4].  
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(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
RRD is associated positively with size (p-value < 0.01), environmental 
sensitivity (p-value < 0.05), auditor type (p-value < 0.1), leverage (p-value < 0.1), and 
company listing status (p-value < 0.1). Hypotheses H4, H5, H6 and H7 are supported. 
According to legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective, larger companies, and 
companies with higher levels of environmental sensitivity, disclose more risk-related 
information to manage stakeholders’ perceptions about corporate reputation. According 
to agency theory, leveraged companies, and companies audited by Big4 auditing firms, 
disclose more risk-related information to reduce agency costs. Listed companies 
disclose more risk-related information than unlisted companies — this can be explained 
either by legitimacy theory or agency theory.  
 The variable, accounting standards, is not statistically significant. The adoption 
of IAS/IFRS did not affect levels of RRD positively. 
Prior literature has found positive and significant associations between RRD and 
independent non-executive directors (Abrahamson & Cox, 2007; Lajili, 2007). Using 
the sub-sample of the 42 listed companies, Table 6 shows that the regression model is 
significant (p-value < 0.01) for RRD (adj. R2 = 0.32). RRD is associated positively with 
independent non-executive directors (p-value < 0.05). This supports H2. According to 
agency theory, independent non-executive directors are important in reducing agency 
costs. This may be the reason why H1 is not supported. In an encouraging sign, it 
appears they are pressing for disclosure even in companies with concentrated 
ownership. H3 (audit committee independence) was not supported. But, in most cases, 
the non-executive director members of the audit committee were independent. 
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  Table 7 summarises the results of our hypothesis testing. Public visibility (size 
and environmental sensitivity) is associated positively with total RRD, consistent with 
the legitimacy and resources-based perspectives adopted in this paper. The variables 
leverage and auditor type are positively associated with total RRD, as is independent 
non-executive directors, but in listed companies only. This result is consistent with 
agency theory. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
 Results for ownership structure are consistent with Abraham and Cox (2007), 
Bushee and Noe (2000), and Mohobbot (2005), all of whom did not find any relation 
between ownership structure and RRD. Abraham and Cox (2007) and Bushee and Noe 
(2000) conclude that non-significant results are related to the investment planning 
strategies of institutional investors.  
The non-significant relation between RRD and audit committee independence is 
consistent with Turley and Zaman (2004) who report that the effect of audit committee 
in controlling agency costs associated with high leverage is inconclusive. From the 
viewpoint of Fraser and Henry (2007) the contribution of audit committee independence 
to enterprise risk management is unclear. This corroborates Spira’s (2003) call for more 
research to investigate the benefits of audit committees.  
 
Conclusions 
Our results support explanations of RRD that are based on a combination of agency 
theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives. Public visibility, assessed 
by size and environmental sensitivity, is a crucial part of company strategy to enhance 
legitimacy and manage corporate reputation through disclosure of risk-related 
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information. Additionally, agency costs associated with leverage and the engagement of 
a Big4 international auditing firm are also important in explaining RRD. Based on an 
analysis of 42 listed companies, we conclude that independent non-executive directors 
are important in reducing agency costs in terms of RRD. 
Our results also confirm that the adoption of high quality accounting standards 
(IAS/IFRS) did not render any improvement in the quantity of RRD. Similarly, the 
adoption of the Modernisation Directive did not improve the quality of RRD. We reveal 
Portuguese companies in the non-finance sector as adopting generic risk reporting 
practices that lack comparability and transparency. Consequently, reader usefulness is 
impaired. This is consistent with prior research that has found a special focus on 
qualitative RRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 
2006) and backward-looking RRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). 
However, our results differ from Linsley and Shrives (2006) who, in a UK context, 
found RRD focused on forward-looking and good news information. The difference can 
be attributed to the divergent environmental contexts of the studies: there is far less 
emphasis on investors’ interests and the information needs of securities markets in 
Portugal than in the UK. 
By reporting mainly qualitative and backward-looking RRD Portuguese managers 
reduce exposure to litigation costs. Although quantitative and forward-looking 
information would be more relevant to decision needs, such disclosure is less common 
because of potential inaccuracy and exposure to litigation costs.  
The results reported should be useful to accounting and risk regulators by 
providing information about the inadequacies of RRD in Portugal and a more complete 
picture of risk components and determinants. When we think about risk in global terms, 
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we should consider not only agency variables but also factors associated with visibility, 
legitimacy and reputation. 
Several limitations should be noted. First, the subjectivity in the coding instrument 
is likely to affect reliability. Second, it would be useful to supplement our results with 
results obtained using a qualitative research method (such as interviews). Third, 
information about risk can be provided in sources other than annual reports, such as 
interim reports, press-releases, web sites, or prospectuses. Fourth, the study is confined 
to one year/one country analysis and pre-dates the global financial crisis [GFC] of 2008 
and the operationalization of IFRS 7 in January, 2007. Future research should analyse 
the years before, during and after the turmoil caused by the GFC.  
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Table 1: Prior literature on determinants of RRD based on firm’s characteristics 
 
Words
A
m
ra
n 
et
 a
l.
, (
20
09
)
La
jil
i (
20
07
)
Li
ns
le
y 
an
d 
Sh
riv
es
 
(2
00
6)
K
aj
üt
er
 (2
00
6)
M
oh
ob
bo
t (
20
05
)
B
er
et
ta
 a
nd
 
B
oz
zo
la
n 
(2
00
4)
A
br
ah
am
 a
nd
 C
ox
 
(2
00
7)
D
eu
m
es
 a
nd
 
K
ne
ch
el
 (2
00
8)
H
as
sa
n 
(2
00
9)
Size:
   Total sales + + + + + 0
   Total assets 0 + +
   Market capitalization +
   Total revenues + 0
   Sum of market value of equity and book value of debt +
Leverage/Level of risk:
   Product and geographic diversification 0
   Debt to equity ratio 0 0 0 0 + +
   Asset cover 0
   Beta factor 0 0
   Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 0 0
   Quiscore 0
   BiE index +
   Innovest EcoValue’21 TM +
   Variance of 60 month stock returns +
Board composition:
   Number of independent non-executive directors + +
 Independent outside directors/total directors +
   Number of non-executive dependent directors 0
   Number of executive directors 0
   Total number of directors +
Ownership structure:
   Minority controlling votes −
   Free-floats +
   In house managed pension funds −
   Outside managed pension funds 0
   Life assurance funds +
Top 10 shareholder’s holdings, and holdings of 
individuals/foreigners 0
   Shareholdings of non-managers greater than 5% −
   Shareholdings of managers greater than 5% −
Profitability
   Return on assets 0
   Return on equity 0 +
CEO base salary and stock/options 0
Reserves 0
Dual Listing Y Y
Industry Y 0 Y 0 Y Y Y
Foreign subsidiaries/total subsidiaries +
Sales growth per year 0
Book value of inventory/total of assets 0
Book value of receivables/total of asstes 0
Auditor quality (Big6/5) 0
Explanatory variables
Dependent variable
Sentences Disclosure index
Y: statistically significant; +: positive and statistically significant relation; −: negative and statistically significant relation; 0: no relation found
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Table 2: Definition and predicted signs for independent and control variables 
 
Variables Definition Predicted Sign
Ownership Structure Shareholdings greater than 10%.  ?
Minority controlling votes assessed by the highest proportion of voting 
rights that belong to a single shareholder
?
Independent Non-Executive 
Directorsa
Proportion of independent non-executive directors in the board. +
Audit Committee 
Independence
Proportion of non-executive directors in the audit committee. +
External Auditor Quality Dummy variable =1 if auditing firm is a Big 4 firm; 0 otherwise. +
Leverage Debt ratio = total debt to total assets ?
Size Total assets (1003 Euros) +
Total sales (1003 Euros) +
Number of employees +
Environmental Sensitivity Dummy variable = 1 if company belongs to an industry 
environmentally sensitive; 0 oherwise
+
Company Listing Status Dummy variable = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated
stock exchange markets; 0 otherwise.
+
Accounting Standards Dummy variable = 1 if company adopted IAS/IFRS; 0 otherwise. ?
Panel A: Independent Variables
Agency theory
Legitimacy theory and resources-based prespective
Panel B: Control Variables
a Our definition of independent directors is consistent with that provided by Regulation 7/2001, article 1, from CMVM, which
does not permit family members (Regulation 7/2001 from the CMVM, amended by the Regulation 3/2006, states in its 1st article,
nº 2, al. (f) that these members must not have any relation, whatsoever, with the owning family).
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Table 3: Frequencies and differences in the means (medians) of risk-related sentence 
attributes 
Bad News 1,548 751 795 2
Good News 1,611 452 1,009 150
Neutral News 423 120 56 247
Past 3,335 1,205 1,732 398
Future 247 118 128 1
Non-Monetary 2,701 641 1,661 399
Monetary 881 682 199 0
Voluntary 2,189 325 1,695 169
Mandatory 1,393 998 165 230
Total        3,582 1,323 1,860 399
Panel B: Differences in means (medians) of risk-related sentence attributes
Bad news − Good news -0.78 3.69 *** -2.64 -1.83 ***
(3.00) (4.00) *** -(1.00) (0.00) ***
Past − Future 38.12 *** 13.42 *** 19.78 *** 4.90 ***
(32.00) *** (11.00) *** (17.00) *** (2.00) ***
Non-monetary − Monetary 22.47 *** -.51 18.05 *** 4.93 ***
(16.00) *** (0.00) (15.00) *** (2.00) ***
Voluntary − Mandatory 9.83 *** -8.31 *** 18.89 *** -.75
(9.00) *** -(7.00) *** (16.00) *** (1.00)
Paired sample t -tests (Wilcoxon rank tests) are used to test the difference in means (medians).
Difference statistically significant at a: ***0.01 level (two-tailed); **0.05 level (two-tailed); *0.1 level (two-tailed).
Risk -related 
disclosures Financial risk
Non-financial 
risk
Panel A: Frequencies of risk-related categories for each sentence attributes
Risk 
management 
framework
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics for the sample firms 
 Unit of measurement N Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Mean
Continuous variables
Risk-related disclosures Number of sentences 81 4.00 143.00 30.79 44.22
Shareholdings greater than 10% Percentage 81 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.74
Minority controlling votes Percentage 79 0.10 1.00 0.29 0.57
Independent non-executive directors Percentage 42 0.00 0.44 0.17 0.14
Audit committee independence Percentage 42 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.36
Leverage Debt ratio 81 0.15 9.47 0.83 1.03
Total assets 1003 Euros 81 3.57 44,536.12 6,298.35 2,350.27
Total sales 1003 Euros 81 0.00 22,800.00 3,105.02 1,102.76
Number of employees Count 81 0.00 68,218.00 9,134.47 3,327.23
Dummy variables
Frequency Per cent
Auditor type Dummy = 1 81 46 56.79
             = 0 35 43.21
Environmental sensitivity Dummy = 1 81 44 54.32
             = 0 37 45.68
Company listing status Dummy = 1 81 42 51.85
             = 0 39 48.15
Accounting standards Dummy = 1 81 53 65.43
             = 0 28 34.57
Total 81 100.00
Definition of variables:
Shareholdings greater than 10% = percentage of qualified shareholdings greater than 10%; Minority controlling votes =
highest percentage of voting rights that belong to a single shareholder; Independent non-executive director = percentage of
independent non-executive directors in the board; Audit committee independence = percentage of non-executive directors in
the audit committee; Auditor type = 1 if the auditing firm is a Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = ratio of total debt to
total assets; Environmental sensitivity = 1 if the company belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise;
Company listing status = 1 if the company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise;
Accounting standards = 1 if the company adopted IAS/IFRS, and 0 otherwise).
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Table 5 – Bivariate relationships for the independent and control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Correlations (Pearson) among continuous variables
(1) Risk-related disclosures 1.00
(2) Ownership structure -0.16 * 1.00
(3) Independent non-executive directors 0.42 *** -0.28 ** 1.00
(4) Audit committee independence 0.49 *** 0.10 0.36 ** 1.00
(5) Leverage 0.15 * -0.05 0.00 -0.05 1.00
(6) Size 0.39 *** 0.03 0.44 *** 0.74 *** -0.06 1.00
Panel B: Correlations  (Spearman) between the categorical and continuous variables
(7) Auditor type 0.34 *** -0.04 0.19 0.33 *** -0.24 ** 0.48 *** 1.00
(8) Environmental sensitivity 0.23 ** -0.05 -0.28 *** -0.12 0.06 -0.07 0.18 * 1.00
(9) Company listing status 0.34 *** -0.50 *** . . 0.05 0.19 ** 0.24 ** 0.01 1.00
(10) Accounting standards 0.31 *** -0.34 *** . . 0.01 0.39 *** 0.33 *** -0.03 0.76 *** 1.00
Definition of variables:
Significant at the: ***0.01 level (one-tailed); **0.05 level (one-tailed); *0.1 level (one-tailed).
Ownership structure = Principal components analysis (Shareholdings greater than 10%; Minority controlling votes); Independent non-executive director = percentage of
independent non-executive directors in the board; Audit committee independence = percentage of non-executive directors in the audit committee; Auditor type = 1 if the
auditing firm is a Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = ratio of total debt to total assets; Size = Principal components analysis (Total assets; Total sales; Number of
employees); Environmental sensitivity = 1 if the company belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise; Company listing status = 1 if the company is
listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Accounting standards = 1 if the company adopted IAS/IFRS, and 0 otherwise).
 
 
  
40 
 
Table 6 – Results of regression model for RRD 
Intercept -0.59 -(2.60) ††† -0.11 -(0.32)
Ownership structure ? -0.04 -(0.31) 0.17 (0.79)
Independent non-executive directors + 0.43 (1.13) **
Audit committee independence + 0.34 (2.57)
Auditor type + 0.35 (1.48) * 0.32 (0.88)
Leverage ? 0.19 (1.89) † -0.01 -(0.03)
Size + 0.31 (2.53) *** 0.10 (0.34)
Environmental sensitivity + 0.42 (2.06) ** 0.43 (1.56)
Company listing status + 0.54 (1.65) *
Accounting standards ? -0.19 -(0.57)
R 2 (F-stat) 0.33 (4.90) ††† 0.44 (3.62) †††
Adj. R 2 0.26 0.32
Durbin-Watson 2.32 2.05
Max. VIF 2.88 3.71
N 77 40
Regression models: RRDj  = f  (Aj , LRbj , Cj ) + υj
Definition of variables:
Significant at the: ***0.01 level (one-tailed); **0.05 level (one-tailed); *0.1 level (one-tailed)
Significant at the: †††0.01 level (two-tailed); ††0.05 level (two-tailed); †0.1 level (two-tailed)
Dependent and independent continuous variables were normalised using Blom's transformation. Figures in parentheses are
t -satistics. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, when necessary. 
Ownership structure = principal components analysis (Shareholdings greater than 10%; Minority controlling votes);
Independent non-executive director = percentage of independent non-executive directors in the board; Audit committee
independence = percentage of non-executive directors in the audit committee; Auditor type = 1 if the auditing firm is a
Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = ratio of total debt to total assets; Size = principal components analysis (Total
assets; Total sales; Number of employees); Environmental sensitivity = 1 if the company belongs to an environmentally
sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise; Company listing status = 1 if the company is listed on one or more regulated stock
exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Accounting standards = 1 if the company adopted IAS/IFRS, and 0 otherwise).
Variables Pred. Sign Listed and unlisted 
companies
Listed companies
Risk-related disclosures
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Table 7 - Summary of the results from the hypotheses testing  
Variables Predicted signal Risk-related disclosures
Ownership structure ? Not significant
Independent non-executive directors + Significanta
Audit committee independence + Not significantb
Auditor type + Significant
Leverage ? Significant and positive
Size + Significant
Environmental sensitivity + Significant
a, b These significant relations have been found in listed companies. Only these companies disclosed information
about the number of independent non-executive directors and composition of audit committees in their corporate
governance reports.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Recommendation 3/2005 requires management to describe the existing internal control system. 
2 The mandatory disclosure requirement in the Modernisation Directive is vague and permits 
management’s discretion. To overcome potential classification problems we considered the disclosures 
mandatory if they were made in sections of the management report specifically devoted to risk 
management. 
3 In a few cases, when consolidated accounts were not available, we used annual reports. 
4 The exclusion of outliers and influential observations improved the explanatory power of the regression 
model. 
